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Article 8

THE ELEPHANT IN THE CLASSROOM:

A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING
VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY TO STUDENT SPEECH
IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL SETTING
Alexis Zouhary*
INTRODUCTION

In Morse v. Frederick,' the Supreme Court's latest (and, some
might say, futile) foray into student speech rights, Justice Stevens chastised the majority for creating a jurisprudential test that "invites stark
viewpoint discrimination" 2 in violation of a "cardinal First Amendment principle[]. '' 3 However, just as quickly as Stevens condemned
the Court's abandonment of viewpoint neutrality, he conceded that,
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, "it
might well be appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting." 4 Stevens' dissent, which held tightly to
the notion that viewpoint discrimination is a most "egregious" 5 constitutional violation, but seemed inclined to loosen its grip in the school
setting, epitomizes the uncertainty characterizing the Court's application of viewpoint neutrality to student speech.
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 2006. Special thanks to Professor Richard W. Garnett for his guidance
and insight throughout the writing process.
1 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007).
2 Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the Court has never precisely
defined "viewpoint discrimination," according to Daniel Farber:
Presumably, the idea is that some perspectives on a topic are allowed while
opposing views are not.... [One] problem is deciding what counts as an
opposing viewpoint, because this depends on how we conceptualize the relevant debate. The easiest picture involves one person affirming and the other
denying a proposition. A statute that distinguishes between a statement and
its negation is clearly viewpoint-based.
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FirsT AMENDMENT 30-31 (2d ed. 2003).

3
4
5

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2646.
Id. at 2644.
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Despite Morse's ostensibly disparate 5-4 opinion, most Justices
agreed that a "school's . . . interest in protecting its students" 6 war-

rants a viewpoint-based restriction of illegal drug advocacy. 7 But by
carving out a narrow, fact-specific exception to otherwise protected
speech, the decision only adds to the confusion and complexity characterizing the First Amendment's role in the school setting. Indeed,
after Morse, the elephant in the classroom-the First Amendment's
viewpoint-neutrality requirement-remains. The Court's latest opinion, in conjunction with the current circuit split over viewpoint-based
regulations as applied to school-sponsored speech, 8 proves the controversy really is too big to ignore.
Particularly in the last forty years, courts have decided a wide
range of First Amendment claims arising in the secondary school context. In fact, some might say that students today are too quick to
sound "the First Amendment bugle"9 in response to administrators'
restrictions of their speech. Although students' free speech rights are
often taken for granted, the First Amendment's application to public
education is actually quite paradoxical. The First Amendment operates to constrain governmental control of citizens' thoughts and
beliefs, yet public schools are government-run institutions essentially
established to do just that.1 0 The possible incompatibility marking the
relationship between the First Amendment and the educational enterprise comes to the fore when the Court confronts the issue of viewpoint neutrality in student speech cases.
The "special characteristics" of the school setting have prompted
the Supreme Court to identify two categories of student expression:
school-sponsored speech-speech occurring in an educational context that "members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
6 Id. at 2646.
7 Id. at 2645. The primary disagreement in Morse stemmed from divergent interpretations of the specific banner at issue. According to the dissent, "BONG HiTS 4

JESUS" is correctly categorized as a "silly," "nonsense message," not advocacy of illegal
drug use. Id. at 2649.
8 Compare Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926-28 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding that Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988),
allows viewpoint discrimination), and Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir.
1993) (same), with Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,
631-33 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Hazelwood prohibits viewpoint discrimination),
and Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817,
827-28 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (same).
9 Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2629.
10 See generally Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be 'Free Speech' in Public
Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 45 (2008) (questioning whether the freedom of
speech can be meaningfully imported into government-run schools).
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the imprimatur of the school"'' l -and independent student speech"personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises."' 2
This distinction provides a framework through which the Court
should import viewpoint neutrality into the secondary public school
setting. Specifically, there are two situations in which the government
should be authorized to make viewpoint-based restrictions of student
speech: (1) in the realm of school-sponsored speech, when justified by
a school's pedagogical interests; and (2) in the realm of independent
student speech, when necessary to prevent a serious disruption of the
school environment.
To set the stage for this argument, Part I traces the judicial system's condemnation of viewpoint discrimination in various First
Amendment contexts and examines its hazy categorization as a specific type of content discrimination. Part II analyzes how the Supreme
Court has applied (or neglected to apply) the doctrine of viewpoint
neutrality in the so-called "trilogy of student speech"'13 - Tinker, Fraser,
and Hazelwood. Part III highlights the confusion characterizing viewpoint neutrality's application to student speech, summarizing the circuit split Hazelwood engendered and exploring the Court's equivocal
treatment of the issue in its most recent student speech case, Morse.
Finally, Part IV proposes that courts should draw on the doctrinal
framework of Tinker and Hazelwood, balancing the government's interest as educator with students' expressive interests as citizens, when
applying viewpoint neutrality to student speech in the secondary
school setting. In light of the proposed framework, this Part concludes that Morse, which created a new category of permissible viewpoint-based restrictions, was decided incorrectly.
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF VIEWPOINT NEuTRALITY: A FIXED STAR IN THE
"CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTELLATION"

OF FREE SPEECH

In Morse, the dissent voiced its discomfort with an opinion
upholding a "punishment meted out on the basis of a listener's disa14
greement with her understanding . . . of the speaker's viewpoint."'
Such sensitivity and discomfort should be expected in light of the

Court's historical commitment to viewpoint neutrality.1 5 For years,
the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination has been a "fixed star
11 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
12 Id.
13 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
14 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 22-35.

2230

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

83:5

in [America's] constitutional constellation. ' 16 Indeed, disapproval of
viewpoint discrimination and the 'jurisprudential pursuit of its converse, 'viewpoint neutrality,"' stem from the values enshrined in the
First Amendment's free speech guarantees. 1 7 These values include
the pursuit of truth through the free exchange of ideas,18 the proper
20
19
functioning of a democracy, and the fulfillment of self-expression.
Although the restriction of speech on the basis of viewpoint has the
potential to undermine all of these values, it particularly threatens the
marketplace of ideas, "pos [ing] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas . . . or manipulate the public debate through
'2 1
coercion rather than persuasion."
The principle of viewpoint neutrality can be traced to Hague v.
22
Committee for Industrial Organization,
which declared an ordinance
governing the issuance of permits to speak on public streets invalid
because it could "be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of
free expression of views."' 23 Interestingly, however, the Court's heightened concern for viewpoint neutrality was first made explicit in the
school setting. 24 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,25 a
case heard while the nation was in the midst of World War II, the
Court found a public school's mandatory flag salute unconstitutional,
16 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
17 See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination,24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100
(1996).
18 SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 36-71 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991)
(1859); see also, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[T] he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market .... ").
19 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) ("[C]itizens
may not be barred [from speaking] because their views are thought to be false or
dangerous. No plan of action should be outlawed because someone in control thinks
it unwise, unfair, un-American. No speaker may be declared 'out of order' because
we disagree with what he intends to say. And the reason for this equality of status in
the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundations of the self-governing process....
The principle of freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of
self-government.").
20 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 994 (1978) ("To engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage in selfdefinition or expression."); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 591, 593 (1982) (arguing that the freedom of speech ultimately serves only one
value: "individual self-realization").
21 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
22 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see Heins, supra note 17, at 105.
23 Hague, 307 U.S. at 516 (opinion of Roberts, J.).
24 See Heins, supra note 17, at 105.
25 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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asserting that no official could "prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." 26 Barnette
recognized the government's unique pedagogical interests in the
school setting, 27 but the "compulsion" 28 of students to declare a particular belief triggered its heightened totalitarian alarm. In powerful,
poignant rhetoric, Justice Jackson warned that "[t]hose who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters." 29 Although the Court found the student's refusal to
salute the flag to be "harmless to others" and "the State,"'3 0 it hinted
that viewpoint neutrality must perdure even when expressions pose a
31
greater threat.
In the years following Barnette, courts continued to adhere to the
principle of viewpoint neutrality, affirming its application in a variety
of contexts. For example, they struck down laws denying government
benefits to citizens on the basis of their speech 32 and "invalidate [d]
licensing and other benefit schemes" providing government officials
with "opportunities for discriminatory decisionmaking." 33 Moreover,
the Supreme Court held that even when the government regulates an
unprotected category of speech, such as "fighting words," it still may
26

Id. at 642.

27 See id. at 631 ("[T]he State may 'require teaching by instruction and study of
all in our history and in the structure and organization of our government, including
the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country.'"
(quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone,J., dissenting), overruled by Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943))).
28 Id. at 631.
29 Id. at 641.
30 Id. at 642.
31 See id. ("[The] freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom."). But see Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discriminationin Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 647, 655 (2005)
("One could argue that the real proscription in Barnette is not based on the lofty
constellation of abstract principles, but one based on practical concerns. Put in
today's language, we could add an explanatory line in Barnette stating that... Muslim
children should not come home as Christians, or based on the facts of Barnette, children who are Jehovah's Witnesses should not come home as mainstream Protestants
who show their patriotism in a 'normal' or acceptable way.").
32 See Heins, supra note 17, at 108; see also, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
519 (1958) (striking down a California law requiring a loyalty oath as a qualifying
condition for a tax exemption because it was "'aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas'" (quoting Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950))).
33 Heins, supra note 17, at 108; see, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
271-73 (1951) (holding a municipality's standardless permit requirement, which
granted officials "limitless discretion" in enforcement, unconstitutional and concluding that the "use of the park was denied because of the City Council's dislike for or
disagreement with the Witnesses or their views").
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not "target disfavored messages. '34 Thus, regardless of the method of
governmental action-whether it be forced speech, "manipulation of
benefit and subsidy programs," or direct suppression-the doctrine of

35
viewpoint neutrality applies.

While the Court was reifying the principle of viewpoint neutrality
during the second half of the twentieth century, it was also developing
a broader, "parallel line of precedent" condemning content-based discrimination by government. 36 Indeed, although the emergence of the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations is a
relatively recent phenomenon, it now comprises "a core principle of
free speech analysis. '37 The Court first relied on a content-based distinction in Police Department v. Mosley, 38 striking down an ordinance

39
that permitted certain types of picketing based on subject matter.
According to Mosley: "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
' 40
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
Under First Amendment doctrine, content-based regulations
must meet strict scrutiny-that is, they must be "narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest"4 1-while content-neutral regula-

34 Heins, supra note 17, at 109. In R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992),
the Court struck down a hate speech law because it specifically "proscribed fighting
words.., that communicat[ed] messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance."
Id. at 393-94.
35 See Heins, supra note 17, at 109.
36 See id. at 110.
37 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 53 (2000). The
explanation for this distinction is that the First Amendment is not only concerned
with "the extent to which a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but
also-and perhaps even more fundamentally-with the extent to which the law distorts public debate." Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 198 (1983). But see Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction
in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 113 (1981) (attacking the content
distinction as "both theoretically questionable and difficult to apply"). Redish makes
a valid and meaningful critique of this judicially constructed distinction, as contentneutral restrictions sometimes reduce the quality and quantity of speech more than
their more suspect, content-based counterparts. See id. at 128-30.
38 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
39 Id. at 95 ("The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject
of a school's labor-management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing
is prohibited.").
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-71
(1990) (upholding restrictions on corporate political expenditures under strict
scrutiny).
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tions, which merely control the "time, place, and manner" of speech,
are subjected to a less rigorous intermediate scrutiny test.42 According to courts, "Content is a spacious concept that embraces whole subjects of discourse regardless of the 'viewpoint' expressed." 4 3 Thus,
while content-based restrictions regulate a "subject matter, a topic, or
a category of speech," viewpoint-based restrictions regulate "'one's
opinion, judgment, or position' within the subject matter, topic or
category."44

Given that content-based restrictions pass constitutional muster if
they survive strict scrutiny, presumably, the same doctrinal rule would
apply to viewpoint-based regulations, which are, after all, a subcategory of content-based restrictions. However, drawing on the Court's
unforgiving rhetoric concerning viewpoint discrimination, 4 5 some
have suggested that viewpoint-based restrictions are "per se unconstitutional." 46 Indeed, although "the Court has never specifically faced
this question," it has "hinted that the rule for viewpoint-based restric47
tions may be more stringent than for content-based restrictions.
For example, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent,48 the
Court stated that "there are some purported interests-such as a
desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause,
or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas-that are so plainly illegitimate that they would
immediately invalidate the rule." 4 9 And in Boos v. Bary,50 the Court,
while classifying the content-based regulation at issue as viewpoint
neutral, asserted that a viewpoint-based regulation carries a "label with
5
potential First Amendment ramifications of its own."

1

42 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("Our precedents
thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. . . . In contrast,
regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate
level of scrutiny . . . ." (citations omitted)).
43 Heins, supra note 17, at 101.
44 Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About FavoredRights: Hill
v. Colorado, the VanishingPublicForum, and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination
Test, 51 Am. U. L. REv. 179, 194-95 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
46 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2425 n.44 (1996).
47 Id.
48 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
49
50

Id. at 804.
485 U.S. 312 (1988).

51

Id. at 319.

2234

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83:5

Despite misleading statements like those in Members of the City
Council and Boos, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to viewpointbased regulations.5 2 In fact, according to Professor Eugene Volokh,
although an absolute ban on viewpoint-based restrictions "might be
an appealing principle ...it is [not] the doctrine. '5 3 For example, in
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,5 4 the Court applied
strict scrutiny to a restriction based on religious advocacy; 55 significantly, on that very day, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia,5 6 the Court held the same type of restriction to be viewpointbased. 57 Ultimately, while the method of analysis for viewpoint-based
restrictions still remains a bit unclear, even if strict scrutiny is applied,
a finding of viewpoint discrimination essentially ends the inquiry. 58
Uncertainty clouds not only the determination of what level of
judicial scrutiny applies to viewpoint-based restrictions, but also the
determination of what distinguishes a viewpoint-based restriction
from a content-based restriction. Due to judicial "linguistic imprecision '' 59 and the admitted difficulty of differentiating between the
closely entwined, overlapping concepts, 60 the Court has often conflated the two. 6 1 Line-drawing difficulties particularly arise when a
point of view represents a philosophy or system of beliefs. The disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Rosenberger, regard52 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992) (applying strict
scrutiny to a viewpoint-based regulation); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to a Texas statute prohibiting flag desecration).
53 See Volokh, supra note 46, at 2425 n.44.
54 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
55 See id. at 761.
56 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
57 See id. at 830-31.
58 See Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 56 ("As the law has developed, subject-matter restrictions on speech have been upheld, at times, but viewpoint restrictions have
never been upheld.").
59 Heins, supra note 17, at 110; see also, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (merging the concepts of content and viewpoint, stating that the
Court's "precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its
content").
60 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 737 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring)
("There is always a correlation with subject and viewpoint when the law regulates
conduct that has become the signature of one side of a controversy."); Rosenberger,515
U.S. at 831 (acknowledging that "the distinction [between content and viewpoint] is
not a precise one").
61 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality .

.

. is whether the government has

adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys.").
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ing whether a university's refusal to fund a religious student
organization's publication constituted impermissible viewpoint dis62
crimination, illustrates this complexity.
Content-based regulations, though always viewed skeptically
through a First Amendment lens, are not always required to meet
strict scrutiny. When speech takes place on government property, the
level of judicial scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions varies
according to the type of forum at issue. 63 In traditional public forathose places "which have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public," 64 such as parks and sidewalks-content-based restrictions will be upheld only if they pass strict scrutiny. 65 In limited public
fora, defined as those places "the State has opened for expressive
activity by part or all of the public," the same restrictions binding the
government in public fora govern; 6 6 however, the government may
limit the forum to the purpose for which it was created, even if this
means restricting speakers or subjects. 6 7 In contrast, in nonpublic
fora, those government-owned places that are "not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication," 68 the government may
make content-based restrictions on speech provided that such regulations are both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 69 Notably, even in
nonpublic fora, where the greatest content-based restrictions are permissible, viewpoint discrimination is forbidden.7 0 Indeed, the only
62 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it
also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which
a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. The prohibited perspective,
not the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments,
for the subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved category of publications."); cf id. at 898 (Souter, J., dissenting) (contending that "the Court's decision
equating a categorical exclusion of both sides of the religious debate with viewpoint
discrimination" essentially "eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content").
63 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
("The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which
limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of
the property at issue.").
64 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Rob-

erts, J.).
65 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
66 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
67 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
68 Id.
69 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(asserting that restrictions on access to a nonpublic forum must be "reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and . . . viewpoint neutral").

70 See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (asserting that the state, as proprietor of a nonpublic forum, may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
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area in which the government may unequivocally make viewpoint71
based distinctions is when it is the speaker.
II.

THE "TiRLOGY's" TREATMENT OF VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY

Despite the Supreme Court's application and enforcement of the
principle of viewpoint neutrality throughout various First Amendment
contexts, 7 2 it has never clearly articulated when the requirement
should be imposed on restrictions of student speech. 73 However, the
Court has clearly articulated two well-settled principles that frame any
constitutional inquiry into the First Amendment rights of secondary
public school students. 7 4 First, "[situdents . . . are 'persons' under

76
[the] Constitution"' 75 and possess free speech rights while at school.

Second, these rights "are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings." 77 While most agree that students' free

speech rights should be shaped by the nature of the school enterprise,
exactly how and why they should differ in the school setting remains
far from settled. The current conflict over viewpoint neutrality's place
in public schools is a paradigmatic example of the difficulties faced
when applying First Amendment principles to the specialized institution of public education.
Before Morse was decided in 2007, a trilogy of Supreme Court
78
cases- Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,79 and Hazelwood School District v.

otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view" (citation omitted)). However, the prohibition on viewpoint-based restrictions in nonpublic fora appears to be "a 'presum[ptive]' ban." Volokh, supra note 46, at 2426 n.44
(alteration in original) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 831 (1995)). For example, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union School
District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), the Court was "willing to consider a claim that a viewpoint-based restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum passes muster under strict
scrutiny." Volokh, supra note 46, at 2426 n.44.
71 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
72 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
73 See Roy, supra note 31, at 648.
74 See Garnett, supra note 10, at 49 (describing the "[t]wo principles, or maxims,
fram[ing] the justices' analysis in Morse").
75 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
76 See id. But see Morse v. Frederick 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2634 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("As originally understood, the Constitution does not afford students a
right to free speech in public schools.").
77 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
78 393 U.S. 503.
79 478 U.S. 675.
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KuhlmeieiS°-provided the foundation for evaluating the free speech
claims of public school students. Collectively, the cases reveal that the
Court's silence regarding the First Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination does not evince a lack of concern for the dangers
it implicates. In fact, the Court's desire to provide some protection
against viewpoint discrimination clearly animated all three of its
opinions.
A.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

Tinker, the so-called foundation of modern student speech jurisprudence, affirmed that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech.., at the schoolhouse gate."8' In Tinker,
a school district suspended five high school students who donned
black armbands to voice their political opposition to the United
States' military action in Vietnam.8 2 Recognizing self-expression as an
integral part of the educational process, the Court found the suspensions unconstitutional.8 3 According to Tinker, the First Amendment
protects a student's right to express his opinions, even on "controversial subjects," unless the speech "'materially and substantially"' disrupts the educational mission of the school or invades the rights of
84
others.
Particularly sensitive to the unpopular viewpoint at issue, Tinker
underscored the fact that the school district did not seek to prohibit
all politically controversial symbols, but only those armbands opposing the Vietnam War.8 5 In fact, much of the Court's opinion relied on
the theoretical basis for the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality: the fear
that too much governmental control will reduce the diversity of ideas
86
in the marketplace, distorting the search for truth.
87
Tinker is widely regarded as an expansive free speech decree
and, in many respects, it certainly is. However, Justice Fortas' liberta80 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
81 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
82 See id. at 504.
83 See id. at 514.
84 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
85 See id. at 510-11.
86 See id. at 512 (stating that the "'robust exchange of ideas,'" not "'authoritative
selection,"' will facilitate the search for truth (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))).
87 See, e.g.,
Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint
Discrimination,110 W. VA. L. REv. 187, 201 (2007) (noting that "numerous commentators and scholars" describe Tinker as the "'high water mark' of student speech rights"
(internal citation omitted)).

2238

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:5

rian tone causes some to overlook the Court's intimation that certain
viewpoint-based regulations may be constitutionally valid in the school
setting. While Tinker struck down the regulation at issue because
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression," 88 it simultaneously
sanctioned viewpoint-based regulations where there is a showing that
the expression would materially and substantially interfere with the
educational process. Indeed, by stating "[i] n order for the State ...to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion," 89 the Court
presumptively concedes that, in certain circumstances, the state can
regulate speech on the basis of viewpoint.
B.

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

Although Tinker recognized "the special characteristics of the
school environment," 90 it "did not explore in great detail . . . the
implications" that the mission of public education might have on students' free speech rights9 and, namely, why such rights might be
altered in the school setting. Subsequent cases have confronted these
implications and, in so doing, significantly curtailed the reach of
Tinker.9 2 For example, the Court, in Fraser,granted schools wide latitude in regulating "vulgar," "lewd, indecent, or offensive speech,"
maintaining that it is a "highly appropriate function of public school
education" 93 to inculcate "habits and manners of civility" in
94
students.

Fraserupheld a high school's suspension of a student for delivering a speech at an assembly that contained "an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor," 95 despite the fact that lower courts found it
caused no disruption and, therefore, could not be regulated under
Tinker.9 6 The Court acknowledged that the student's speech was, in
Justice Brennan's words, "far removed from the very narrow class of
obscene speech" designated as unprotected by the First Amendment.9 7 However, according to Fraser,more restrictive rules for the
88

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.

89

Id. at 509.

90 Id. at 506.
91 See Garnett, supra note 10, at 53.
92 See infra Parts II.B-C, III.B.
93 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
94 Id. at 681 (internal citation omitted).
95 Id. at 678
96 See id. at 686-87.
97 Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Normally, in order to qualify as obscene, speech must satisfy the three-
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school setting are appropriate because "the State has interests in
teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school
activities.'98

Although Fraserdid not apply the Tinker standard, " [t] he mode of
analysis [it] employed" remains somewhat of a mystery, and courts
continue to disagree on the scope of its proper application. 99 But
while Frasersmethod of analysis may have been ambiguous, the Court
was clear that the regulation it upheld pertained to the manner of the
student's expression-not its viewpoint.1° ° Indeed, in his concurring

opinion,Justice Brennan reinforced that there was no suggestion that
school officials attempted to regulate Fraser's "speech because they
disagreed with the views he sought to express." 10 1
C.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

That the speech at issue in Fraserwas given at an official school
assembly factored into the majority's decision, but the Court's holding focused more on the lewd nature of the student's speech than the
context in which the speech was given. However, the circumstances
surrounding student speech became critical to the constitutional
inquiry after Hazelwood, which marked a sea change in deference
given to school administrators. In Hazelwood, the Court again
eschewed a Tinker analysis, this time in upholding a school's decision
to excise two articles from the school newspaper because of content
10 2
deemed "inappropriate" for publication.
The first newspaper article censored by the school described the
experiences of three pregnant students. Although the students' identities were ostensibly protected through the use of pseudonyms, the
prong test advanced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973): (1) "the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) "the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law";
and (3) "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
98 Fraser,478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007). Although Fraseris generally
understood to "support the school's power to restrict vulgar speech by its students," it
can also be interpreted "as being limited to the speech of students who are participating in school-endorsed events." EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
RELATED STATUTES

377 (2d ed. 2005).

100

See Fraser,478 U.S. at 683.

101

Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).

102

See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
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principal feared they would be identifiable nonetheless.10 3 According
to the principal, privacy concerns and the article's references to sexual activity and birth control-topics he deemed inappropriate for
younger students-motivated his decision to delete the article. 10 4 The
second article discussed the impact of divorce on students and
10 5
included critical remarks from a named student about her father.
The principal cited similar privacy concerns for this article's
0 6

deletion.1

Deviating from the Court's approach in Tinker and Fraser,Hazelwood began with a forum analysis. 10 7 Since Perry EducationalAss'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n'0 8 was decided in 1983, forum analyses
often constitute a court's initial step in First Amendment jurisprudence when the expression at issue takes place on government property. 10 9 Public schools are usually considered nonpublic fora; in fact,
in order for a school to be categorized as a limited or public forum,
school authorities must have opened the facilities for "'indiscriminate
use by the general public,' or by some segment of the public, such as a
student organization." '" 0 Because the school paper in Hazelwood was
published in connection with journalism classes and school officials
maintained control over its publication, the Court concluded that it
was intended to be a "supervised learning experience for journalism
students," not a forum available for indiscriminate use."' Thus,
according to the forum doctrine, the school's censorship was to be
tested on the basis of reasonableness. 112 Hazelwood asserted that it was
"this standard, rather than .. . Tinker, that govern[ed] [the] case."' 1 3
The Court's distinction between a Tinker inquiry, which governs
the realm of independent student speech and asks whether the First
Amendment requires a school to "tolerate" speech, and a Hazelwood
inquiry, which governs the realm of "school-sponsored speech" and
asks whether a school must "affirmatively . . . promote" student
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id. at 263-64.
107 See id. at 267 ("We deal first with the question of whether [the newspaper] may
appropriately be characterized as a forum for public expression.").
108 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
109 See, e.g.,
id. at 46; see also Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and
Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
71, 76 (2004) ("Perry... originated the forum analysis approach.").
110 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (citation omitted) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
111 Id.
112 See id. at 270.

113

Id.
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speech, was crucial to its holding.1 14 According to Hazelwood, schoolsponsored speech encompasses those "expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school."' 15 In carving out this new category of speech, the Court emphasized that
[e]ducators are entitled greater control over ... [school-sponsored
speech] to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attrib1 16
uted to the school.
Returning to the forum analysis that opened the opinion, Hazelwood
held that school officials may regulate school-sponsored student
speech "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
17
pedagogical concerns."'
Although viewpoint neutrality was not an issue presented to the
Court, as the school district took for granted that its decisions must be
viewpoint neutral, 118 some courts and commentators read Hazelwood
as implicitly authorizing viewpoint discrimination in the realm of
school-sponsored speech so long as the restrictions stem from pedagogical concerns. 1 9 The text of the decision clearly gives educators
120
control over "the style and content" of school-sponsored speech.
However, in clarifying what kind of content-based restrictions a school
could make, the Court stated that administrators must have the power
"to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct
otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social
order." ' 12 1 As Professor R. George Wright observed, this logic
" [i] nescapably . . . authorizes speech regulations based on viewpoint" 122 because what a public school deems inconsistent with the
"shared values of a civilized social order" will often hinge on a viewpoint-based judgment.
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 273.
See infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
See infra notes 142-43, 191 and accompanying text.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683

(1986)).
122 See R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the SurprisingCase for ViewpointBased Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 186 (2007).
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Yet, despite seemingly opening the door for viewpoint-based regulations, the Hazelwood majority failed to address the First Amendment's longstanding commitment to viewpoint neutrality at all. In
light of the forum analysis that frames the opinion 23 and Justice
Brennan's dissent, 124 this omission seems all the more conspicuous.
When Hazelwood was decided, Supreme Court precedent clearly prohibited governmental viewpoint discrimination in any type of forum,
nonpublic or public. 125 Moreover, although the school setting is a
nonpublic forum with a special purpose-implementing an educational mission-"cases requiring viewpoint-neutrality already recognize[d] that non-public fora ...have special purposes that must be
1 26
judicially respected."
While the majority neglected to discuss the First Amendment's
viewpoint-neutrality requirement, Justice Brennan made it a focus of
his fiery dissent. Brennan contended that the material excised by the
high school was "objectionable because of the viewpoint it expressed,"
and accused the school and the Court of "camouflauge [d] viewpoint
discrimination.' 27 Concerned with the "'diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the American system,' "128 he would have found the
school's censorship unconstitutional under Tinker. According to
Brennan, although the state has a "vital . . . mandate to inculcate
moral and political values," it "is not a general warrant to act as
'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-approved topics and
advocacy of all but the official position.' ' 129
Justice Brennan was not alone in his concern for viewpoint neutrality; the parties' briefs and the oral argument transcript reveal that
neither the attorneys nor the Justices ignored the doctrine. Interestingly, the school district's brief assumed and even emphasized that
"[t]he First Amendment strictures against viewpoint discrimination."' 30 Relying on past precedent, it took for granted that, regardless of the forum, viewpoint discrimination is "always subject to the
123 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
124 See infra text accompanying notes 127-29.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 63-70; see also, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) ("[T]he exclusion of a speaker from a
nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise
be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property." (citing Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))).
126 Wright, supra note 122, at 183-84.
127 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 290 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880 (1982) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
129 Id. at 285-86.
130 Brief for the Petitioners at 45, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (No. 86-836).
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most stringent First Amendment scrutiny."'' 31 Framing its argument
in accordance with nonpublic forum doctrine, the school district
argued that the principal's control over the publication could "'be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn [were] reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and [were] viewpoint neutral.' ' 1 32 Thus, it did not contend
that viewpoint discrimination by school administrators should be permitted in certain circumstances, but that the censorship did not constitute viewpoint discrimination at all.' 3 3 Indeed, according to the
school district, the articles were excised based on "the form of expression-the use of quotes and profiles of identifiable subjects-not the
13 4
topics per se or any particular viewpoints on them."
Perhaps more significantly, the oral argument transcript shows a
Court that was preoccupied with how viewpoint neutrality factored
into the jurisprudential equation. The Justices' questions targeted the
issue, their hypotheticals revealing misgivings with the Catch-22 that a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement might impose on schools. Justice
Scalia candidly asked counsel for the school district to "talk about
viewpoint discrimination," stating:
The principal could not exclude an article that discussed teenage
sexuality and pregnancy of some of his students, and portray the
whole thing in a favorable light in effect sanctioning promiscuity by
the students, but would permit an article that discussed the same
topic but seemed to frown upon that kind of activity ....
If he
allows sexuality to be talked about, he has to allow both the pros
135
and the cons of adolescent sex to be set forth, is that right?
Later, he probed: "Are you categorical that the principal or whoever
has the last word cannot exercise that last word on the basis of some
value judgments that discriminate between various positions on particular issues?"' 1 6 While questioning counsel for respondents, the Court
returned to Justice Scalia's hypothetical, substituting marijuana use
for promiscuity. The Court queried why, if a school could presumably
131
132

Id. at 42.
Id. at 32 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 806 (1985)).
133 See id. at 42 ("There has been no suggestion in this case-by the court of
appeals or by respondents-that deletion of the two pages of [the newspaper] constituted any form of viewpoint discrimination. The district court found that not only did
[the principal] not have any objection to any views expressed in the articles, but he
had no objection to the general topics themselves.").

134

Id. at 43.

135

Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (No. 86-836).

136

Id. at 22.
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teach students of the dangers of illegal drug use in the classroom without presenting the opposing view, it could not establish a newspaper
that did the same thing. 137 In response, counsel for respondents differentiated between the school's right to control curricular content
138
and a student's right to self-expression.

Ultimately, the oral argument transcript suggests that several Justices seemed dissatisfied with the Catch-22 implications a viewpointneutrality requirement on school-sponsored speech would entail. In
particular, they worried that such a requirement would force a school
either to have a school paper containing articles endorsing marijuana
use or to have no paper at all. 1 39 However, perhaps unsure of the
ramifications that an explicit abandonment of viewpoint neutrality for
school-sponsored speech might engender-perhaps adhering to the
philosophy ofjudicial restraint-the majority opinion did not address
the issue.
III.

VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY'S CONFUSION CRESCENDOS

In Hazelwoods aftermath, jurisprudence on viewpoint neutrality's
application to student speech has been marked by confusion.
Because the Court failed to explicitly address the applicability of viewpoint neutrality to school-sponsored speech specifically, or to student
speech in general, judges have been left to interpret Hazelwoodas
intent for themselves. Their interpretations have diverged-with
some holding that the Court authorized viewpoint-based restrictions
and others holding that it did not. 140 Morse, the Supreme Court's subsequent student speech case, has only muddled the field further.
A.

The Resulting Circuit Split

The Court's ambiguous position on viewpoint neutrality's application to school-sponsored speech, rather predictably, spawned a
cacophony of lower court opinions. Indeed, the issue is a certifiably
137 See id. at 29 ("What about teaching in the school, I presume that you could try
to teach the students that smoking pot is no good or could you, would you have to
have a teacher come up and give the other side and say on the other hand maybe
smoking pot is good?... Why can the school enforce a point of view in the one case
and not in the other?").
138 See id. ("I do not think that you can pair a newspaper with what they teach in
social studies.").
139 See id. at 37.
140 See infra Part III.A.
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stamped "circuit split."1 4' While the First 14 2 and Tenth 4 3 Circuits
14 4
have explicitly permitted viewpoint-based restrictions, the Second,
Ninth,'1 45 and Eleventh146 Circuits have refused to abandon the viewpoint-neutrality requirement without specific direction from the
Supreme Court. 14 7 Interestingly, although the Third and Sixth Circuits initially ventured to interpret Hazelwood, both "ultimately
148
retracted their opinions on other grounds."'
In 1993, the First Circuit became the first to interpret Hazelwood
as permitting viewpoint-based regulations of speech. In Ward v.
Hickey,149 a nontenured teacher alleged that the school failed to
141 See Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 615 n.27 (5th Cir. 2005) ("A split exists
among the Circuits on the question of whether Hazelwood requires viewpoint
neutrality.").
142 See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir. 1993).
143 See, e.g., Fleming v.Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926-27 (10th
Cir. 2002) ("'Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that educators may impose
non-viewpoint neutral restrictions on the content of student speech in school-sponsored activities so long as those restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.'") (quoting C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172-73 (3d Cir.
1999), affd in part by an equally divided court en banc, vacated in part, 226 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2000)).
144 See, e.g., Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 629-33
(2d Cir. 2005).
145 See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941
F.2d 817, 827-30 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that if it had not classified the speech at
issue as government speech, the court would have been "compelled by Planned
Parenthood to review [the school district]'s actions through a viewpoint neutrality
microscope").
146 See, e.g., Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989); see
also Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Searcey and reaffirming the viewpoint-neutrality requirement). But see id. at
1217 (Black, J., concurring specially) (asserting that Hazelwood allows "viewpointbased discrimination against school-sponsored student expression").
147 Although courts refer to a literal constitutional prohibition of viewpoint-based
restrictions, presumably such restrictions would be "strongly disfavored and ...subject to strict scrutiny." See Wright, supra note 122, at 191 n.118; see also supra text
accompanying notes 52-58 (noting that while the Court's analytical framework for
viewpoint-based restrictions is ambiguous, it is fatal in practice).
148 Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to RestricC.H. ex rel.
tions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REv. 63, 90 n.204 (2008). See, e.g.,
Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1999), affd in part by an equally divided court,
en banc, vacated in part, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (interpreting Hazelwood to allow
viewpoint-based restrictions); Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999),
vacated, 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999) (interpreting Hazelwood to prohibit viewpointbased restrictions).
149 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
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rehire her due to a discussion in her biology class concerning the
abortion of Down's Syndrome fetuses. 50 Although the relevant
speech was a teacher's, not a student's, the First Circuit classified the
speech at issue as "school-sponsored" and conducted a Hazelwood analysis. 15 1 Rejecting the applicability of a nonpublic forum's viewpointneutrality requirement, the court asserted that Hazelwood "[does] not
require that school regulation of school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral.

1

1

52

In C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva,153 which, unlike Ward, involved student speech, a Third Circuit panel endorsed the First Circuit's reading of Hazelwood, upholding a school's restriction of an elementary
student's religious speech, finding it to be related to a pedagogical
purpose. 15 4 According to the panel: "Hazelwood clearly stands for the
proposition that educators may impose non-viewpoint neutral restrictions on the content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as those restrictions are reasonably related to legiti155
mate pedagogical concerns."

Although Oliva was affirmed en banc, the court was "equally
divided on . . . the First Amendment claim,"'156 and declined to

address the issue. However, current Supreme Court Justice Alito,
then sitting on the Third Circuit, authored an impassioned First
Amendment defense of the student's religious speech in which he
explicitly addressed viewpoint neutrality's application to the school
setting. According to Alito, "[V] iewpoint discrimination is prohibited
even in a nonpublic forum if strict scrutiny cannot be satisfied.' 5 7
Fearing that the panel's understanding would lead to "disturbing
results" in which students would be prohibited from expressing their
views by school officials alleging "a pedagogical purpose," he admonished that "[s] uch a regime is antithetical to the First Amendment and
the form of self-government that it was intended to foster.' 1 5 8
Like Alito in Oliva, several circuits have refused to abandon the
viewpoint-neutrality requirement. In 1989, in Searcey v. Harris,159 the
Eleventh Circuit held that Hazelwood permitted school officials to dis150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

See id. at 450.
See id. at 453.
Id. at 454.
195 F.3d 167.
See id. at 175.
Id. at 172-73.
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Id. at 211 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 214.
888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
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criminate based on content, but not viewpoint. 60 Later, in Planned
Parenthood of Southern Nevada, Inc. v. Clark County School District,16 1 the
Ninth Circuit held that a high school's refusal to accept Planned
Parenthood's advertisements in its newspapers, yearbooks, and ath1 62
letic programs had to be both reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
The Second Circuit issued the most recent circuit-level decision
requiring viewpoint-neutral restrictions of school-sponsored speech.
In Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District,1 63 the court
reversed a grant of summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the school district's motivation for censoring a
poster created for a school project. 1 64 According to Peck, "[T]he district court overlooked evidence that [the student's] poster was censored ...because it offered a religious perspective on the topic of how
to save the environment."' 165 Although the court acknowledged that
"Hazelwood's discussion of the proper role of school officials in making curricular judgments seems to suggest that viewpoint-based judgments would be permissible," it found significant that Cornelius and
Perry, the cases Hazelwood cited as authority, both required viewpoint
neutrality.166 Ultimately, the court was reluctant to "conclude that the
Supreme Court would, without discussion and indeed totally sub silentio, overrule Cornelius and Perry-even in the limited context of school67
sponsored speech."'
B. Morse v. Frederick
With the circuit split simmering among the lower courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Morse. But instead of bringing
clarity to viewpoint neutrality's place in public schools, the Court's
most recent student speech case only makes the doctrine's applicability more questionable and confusing. In Morse, a high school princi160 Id. at 1319 n.7, 1325. In Searcey, the Atlanta Peace Alliance sued after the
Atlanta School Board denied the organization access to "career day." See id. at 1316.
According to the Eleventh Circuit, "[a]lthough Hazelwood provides reasons for
allowing a school official to discriminate based on content," it does not permit "educators to discriminate based on viewpoint." Id. at 1325.
161 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
162 Id. at 829. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the school's refusal
to publish Planned Parenthood advertisements in the newspaper was, in fact, both
reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 829-30.
163 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005).
164 See id. at 625.
165 Id. at 630.
166 Id. at 632.
167 Id. at 633.
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pal suspended a student for displaying a banner with the phrase
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" on a sidewalk across the street from the high
school while the Olympic Torch Relay passed by. 1 68 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that, although the relay took
place during school hours and under faculty supervision, the banner
did not constitute school-sponsored speech under Hazelwood because
it was unrelated to the curriculum and there was no appearance of
school sponsorship. 169 However, instead of analyzing the case under
Tinker, as the Ninth Circuit did, 170 the Supreme Court carved out a
new, viewpoint-based doctrinal standard for drug-specific student
speech. According to the majority in Morse, because students' First
Amendment rights may be modified in the school setting, schools may
take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that
171
can reasonably be regarded as advocating illegal drug use.
ChiefJustice Roberts, who authored the opinion, highlighted the
government's established interest in deterring drug use, writing that
"'educat[ing] students about the dangers of illegal drugs and... discourag[ing] their use"' comprise part of a school's educational mission. 172 Moreover, according to the majority, the "severe and
permanent damage" drugs cause to the health of students justified its
holding. 173 However, cognizant that Tinker requires more than an
abstract fear of harm to suppress student speech and, in fact, was perhaps intended to prevent the kind of viewpoint-based restriction the
Court was sanctioning, the majority insisted that the danger here "is
far more serious and palpable" than the armbands that were then
174
before the Court.
Justice Alito, commonly identified as a free speech libertarian, 1 75
concurred in the judgment. In light of his commitment to viewpoint
168 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
169 See id. at 2627 ("[N]o one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner
bore the school's imprimatur."); Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir.
2006) ("Kuhlmeier does not control the case at bar, however, because Frederick's prodrug banner was not sponsored or endorsed by the school, nor was it part of the
curriculum ..

").

170 See Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1120.
171 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628-29.
172 Id. at 2623 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 61a-62a, Morse, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (No. 06-278)).
173 Id. at 2628.
174 Id. at 2629.
175 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater & Adam Liptak, Bush's ConservativeJudge Harbors
LibertarianStreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2005, at Al0 ('Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr. has
vigorously defended freedom of expression, adopting a stance that places him among
a group of conservative judges with a libertarian streak.").
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neutrality in the school setting, 176 his concurrence is initially quite
shocking. However, for Alito, the potential harms caused by drug use
merit an exception to the rule; 177 and he went to great lengths to limit
the holding as such. Justice Alito's narrow, two-pronged concurrence,
which provides the controlling rule, first holds that "a public school
may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as
advocating illegal drug use."1

78

However, the second prong maintains

that Morse "provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue," including speech on issues such as the legalization of marijuana. 179 Thus, by most interpretations, the second prong emasculates the first.
Justice Alito also severely limited the scope of the decision by
emphasizing that the opinion did not authorize any grounds for regulating student speech "that are not already recognized in the holdings
of this Court."'180 Moreover, although he recognized these "other
holdings," it is, at the very least, debatable whether his concurrence
places a viewpoint-neutral gloss on them, significantly cutting back on
prior precedent. On its face, the unequivocal second-prong assertion
that student speech commenting on social and political issues cannot
be regulated conflicts with the Court's holding in Tinker, which
expressly permitted regulation of a political viewpoint that materially
and substantially disrupts the educational process, as well as the viewpoint-based reading of Hazelwood that some adopt.
Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment. Although he
agreed with the Morse majority that a public school may prohibit
speech advocating illegal drug use, his opinion evinces his fundamental disagreementwith all eight of his fellowJustices that the Constitution
grants students any First Amendment rights at all. 8 Employing classic originalist methodology, Thomas reviewed the history of public
education and concluded that "the First Amendment, as originally

176 See supra text accompanying notes 157-58. While sitting on the Third Circuit,
Alito reinforced that "viewpoint discrimination is prohibited" in public schools and
narrowly defined "school-sponsored speech" to exclude student views expressed during curricular activities. C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (Alito, J., dissenting).
177 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 2636.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 2637.
181 See id. at 2629-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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understood, does not protect student speech in public schools."' 82
Thus, he advocated the overruling of Tinker.
While the simplicity of Thomas' approach might be appealing, it
is inconsistent with nearly forty years of precedent affirming Tinker's
proclamation that "students . . . [do not] shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech ... at the schoolhouse gate."18 3 In fact,

not one Justice felt compelled to respond to his argument. Ultimately, Thomas' denial of free speech rights to students is amiss, but
his criticism of the Court's creation of a new judicial exception to
Tinker184 is right on the mark.
IV.

APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY TO STUDENT
SPEECH IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL SETTING

Although the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
clarify viewpoint neutrality's place in public schools, 8 5 it has chosen
not to do so, denying certiorari to several cases explicitly inviting the
Court to resolve the circuit split concerning viewpoint-based restrictions of school-sponsored speech. 18 6 Most recently, in Morse, the
182 Id. at 2630. According to Thomas, early public schools were not places where
students engaged in "freewheeling debates" or explored "competing ideas," but bastions of order and discipline where teachers "commanded and students listened." Id.
Citing nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases, he asserted that schools were
seen as operating under the principle of in loco parentis and that courts "routinely
preserved the rights of teachers to punish speech that the school or teacher thought
was contrary to the interests of the school and its educational goals." Id. at 2632.
Ultimately, Thomas concluded that because nineteenth-century teachers did not recognize students' free speech rights (under state free speech provisions or, after 1868,
the First Amendment) and courts did not enforce them, the First Amendment should
not apply in the school setting. See id. at 2634-35.
183 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
184 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Today, the Court creates another exception. In doing so, we continue to distance ourselves from Tinker,
but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates and when it
does not.").
185 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Peck ex rel. Peck, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006) (No. 05-899) ("This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the conflict in the courts of appeals over the question whether viewpoint-based restrictions on school-sponsored speech are, prima facie,
unconstitutional, even if reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.");
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 537
U.S. 1110 (2003) (No. 02-732) ("Certiorari should be granted to resolve the conflicting views among the circuit courts regarding whether Hazelwood permits public school
officials to impose viewpoint-based restrictions on speech that is deemed "schoolsponsored.").
186 Peck, 547 U.S. 1097; fleming, 537 U.S. 1110.
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Court had another opportunity to set the record straight. The
Supreme Court's reluctance to renounce viewpoint neutrality is not
surprising in light of the competing interests implicated by the doctrine's application to the school setting. On one hand, a public
school is a vehicle for the "maintenance of a democratic political system"'18 7 and must not only teach students about the value of free
speech, but also how to function in a democracy dominated by a marketplace of ideas. On the other hand, a school must inculcate a statespecific set of values and advance a state-prescribed curriculum-tasks
which inevitably limit the marketplace of ideas and constrict First
Amendment principles.
Tinker and Hazelwoods bifurcation of the realm of student speech
provides a means through which viewpoint neutrality can be imported
into secondary schools. In Hazelwood, the Court distinguished
between school-sponsored speech-speech related to an educational
activity that might reasonably be perceived "to bear the imprimatur of
the school"-and independent student speech-speech that merely
"happens to occur on the school premises. ' 18 8 Although neither
Tinker nor Hazelwood explicitly rejected the viewpoint-neutrality
requirement, both opinions implicitly authorize viewpoint-based
restrictions under specific circumstances. This Note argues that
courts should permit viewpoint-based restrictions in these two discrete
situations.
Hazelwood set forth a low threshold for viewpoint-based restrictions of school-sponsored speech to meet constitutional muster-viewpoints can be restricted when the school has a legitimate pedagogical
reason for restricting them. In contrast, Tinker set forth a high threshold for viewpoint-based restrictions of independent student speechviewpoints can be restricted only when a school can prove that the
speech would materially and substantially disrupt classwork. By "aligning the degree of school authority over student speech with the level
of school sponsorship"189-giving administrators greater control over
curricular activities in which the school's own speech is at stake, but
less control over the personal expression of students taking place
outside of a curricular context-the Tinker/ Hazelwood doctrinal
framework appropriately responds to the duality inherent in student
speech cases. Ultimately, while viewpoint neutrality should not be
required for speech that can be regulated under Hazelwood and
187
188
189

Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
Waldman, supra note 148, at 102.
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Tinker, the requirement should remain intact for all speech falling
outside of these two categories.
A.

The Court Should Allow Viewpoint-Based Restrictions of SchoolSponsored Speech Comporting with Hazelwood

The viewpoint-neutrality requirement should be relaxed in the
realm of school-sponsored speech. Several courts' 90 and commentators1 91 have interpreted the text of Hazelwood as authorizing school
officials to make viewpoint-based restrictions if such restrictions have a
pedagogicalpurpose. While this textual argument is a sound one, other
factors also counsel in favor of such a rule. Specifically, an analysis of
the pedagogicalpurpose of the government as educator, in conjunction
with the policy rationales and free speech values that underlie it, demonstrates that viewpoint neutrality should not be required for restrictions of school-sponsored speech comporting with Hazelwood.
However, analogizing school-sponsored speech to government speech
presents perhaps the easiest doctrinal justification for allowing viewpoint-based restrictions under Hazelwood because when the govern19 2
ment speaks, it may express its own viewpoint.
1.

Hazelwood: Textual Evidence Evincing the Court's Intent

The text of Hazelwood presents convincing evidence of a purposeful abandonment of viewpoint neutrality for school-sponsored
speech restrictions reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 19 3 Although the Court did not explicitly disavow the viewpointneutrality requirement, the "specific reasons" it proffered as justifying
educators' greater control over school-sponsored speech suggest its
190 See supra Part III.A.
191 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 122, at 214 ("[T]he school's own speech is hardly
free where a demanding strict scrutiny test, requiring viewpoint neutrality, discourages the school from presenting a clear and consistent stand on significant educational and cultural matters."); JannaJ. Annest, Note, Only the News That's Fit to Print:
The Effect of Hazelwood on the FirstAmendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public
School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (2002) ("Under Hazelwood, public

schools should not be required to maintain viewpoint-neutrality when regulating
school-sponsored speech for legitimate pedagogical reasons.").
192 See infra Part lV.A.5.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 115-21; see also Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened
Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1555, 1556 (2003) ("If a constitutional exception permitting restrictions on student points of view is not compelled by Hazelwood, it is at least
arguably consistent with a fair reading of the decision.").
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sanction of viewpoint-based restrictions. 194 For example, Hazelwood
insisted that a school must "retain the authority" to refuse to sponsor
student speech advocating illegal drug use or promiscuous sex or
speech contradicting other "'shared values." ' 195 Regardless of
whether one interprets this statement as granting a school "'the
authority... to associate itself with any position other than neutrality,'
or 'the authority to refuse.., to associate itself with any position other
than neutrality . . . ,' the import remains the same-a school must
'retain the authority' to decide with which positions it will associate
itself. ' 19 6 Moreover, in a footnote, the majority criticized the dissent's
opinion, which it interpreted as requiring schools to publish the counterpoint of viewpoints, even if those viewpoints are "sexually explicit,
racially intemperate, or personally insulting."1' 97 Articulating the
Catch-22 concern that animated parts of the oral argument, 198 the
majority concluded that the viewpoint-neutral approach advocated by
the dissent would cause schools to "dissolve" newspapers rather than
print such material. 199
In addition, a Court well-versed in applying the forum doctrine
would not merely forget to finish the analysis. Hazelwoods emphasis
on "reasonableness" and omission of "viewpoint neutrality" was intentional. Judge Ebel's decision in Fleming v. Jefferson County School District
R-1, a Tenth Circuit case concerning the constitutionality of viewpoint-based restrictions of a school-sponsored art project,200 bolsters
this proposition:
If Hazelwood required viewpoint neutrality, then it would essentially
provide the same analysis as under a traditional nonpublic forum
case: the restriction must be reasonable in light of its purpose (a
legitimate pedagogical concern) and must be viewpoint neutral. In
light of the Court's emphasis on the "special characteristics of the
school environment," and the deference to be accorded to school
administrators about pedagogical interests, it would make no sense

194 See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 928 (10th Cir.
2002).
195 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (quoting
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
196 F7eming, 298 F.3d at 928 n.8 (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 272).
197 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276 n.9.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
199 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 276 n.9.
200 See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920-22.
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to assume that Hazelwood did nothing more than simply repeat the
20 1
traditional nonpublic forum analysis in school cases.
Based on Hazelwood's viewpoint-infused examples of what might
constitute a legitimate pedagogical reason for restricting school-sponsored speech, its wariness of the implications a viewpoint-neutrality
requirement might impose on schools, and the modified forum analysis it conducts, the Court's authorization of viewpoint-based restrictions for school-sponsored speech seems an implicit-but inevitableconclusion.
2.

The Special Capacity of Government as Educator

Hazelwood's relaxation of the viewpoint-neutrality requirement
for school-sponsored speech can be attributed to the Court's recognition of the government's special capacity of educator. Adaptability is
a hallmark of First Amendment doctrine, which imposes different
constraints on government "depending on the activity at issue, or on
the capacity-regulator, subsidizer, property manager, employer ...
-in which the government acts." 202 Applying the First Amendment
to the government's capacity as educator is a particularly paradoxical
endeavor. The freedom of speech rests on the democratic notion that
"government may not dictate what individuals may say or believe." 20 3
Yet, "[t]o a certain age, children are required by law to receive [a]
governmentally prescribed education, during which time they are
taught what government officials have deemed to be the truth about
20 4
those subjects."
Although "[v] alue inculcation ... has been the tradition of public education since the beginning of the American republic,"2 0 5 this
201 Id. at 926 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But see supra notes
159-67 and accompanying text (discussing how various circuits asserted that it would
be even stranger for the Court to abandon the longstanding requirement without
doing so explicitly).
202 Garnett, supra note 10, at 50; see also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290-91
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The limits
imposed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments on governmental action may vary
in their stringency depending on the capacity in which the government is acting.").
203 Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-EducationalParadox, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
62, 63 (2002).
204 Id. at 64.
205 David A. Diamond, The FirstAmendment and Public Schools: The Case AgainstJudicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477, 499 (1981). For the Founding Fathers, schools
instilled a "republican character in the nation's youth" and assured "the perpetuation
of democracy and its governmental institutionalization." Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposalfor Reconciling the Free Speech Clause with CurricularValues Inculcation in the
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tradition plainly conflicts with the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. In
fact, "from one point of view, the public schools embody in all their
aspects the denial of first amendment rights." 20 6 Selection of curricular topics and textbooks inherently implies certain choices as to social,
moral, or political values. 20 7 Moreover, schools are not merely concerned with conveying specific information, but with "indoctrinating
the participants with the correct notions about information." 20 8 As
Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty note:
Agents of the state-whether they be government bureaucrats,
school principals, or the individual teachers-determine .
whether students will be taught that Columbus was a hero or that he
was a genocidal murderer . . .whether the United States treated
Native Americans fairly in the course of the nation's western expansion ... [and] whether the New Deal will be presented as a legitimate political and economic advance .... 209
Expecting schools to implement a viewpoint-based curriculum in
a viewpoint-neutral manner is-in one word-impossible. In order to
effectuate an educational mission, a school must be able to ensure
that "participants learn whatever lessons [an] activity is designed to
teach." 2 10 Exercising such control over a viewpoint-based curriculum
will often require officials to make viewpoint-based judgments. 2 11 If a
school were forced to sponsor messages contradicting the curriculum,
its educational mission would be constantly undermined.
In Board of Education v. Pico,212 a case probing the constitutionality of a school district's decision to remove certain books from the
school library, 21 3 then-Justice Rehnquist authored his dissenting opinion with the "differentiated roles of government in mind." 2 14 In analyzing the case, he found it "helpful to assess the role of government
as educator, as compared with the role of government as soverPublicSchools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 769, 774 (1995). And in later years, the nation's
"[g]eographic expansion, industrialization" and influx of immigrants "impressed
upon . . . education leaders the need [to] imbue[] children with . . . republican

values ... and unify an increasingly diverse and scattered population." Id. at 775.
206 Diamond, supra note 205, at 497.
207 See Redish & Finnerty, supra note 203, at 84.
208 Diamond, supra note 205, at 497.
209 Redish & Finnerty, supra note 203, at 65.
210 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
211 See, e.g.,
Fleming v.Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 928 (10th Cir.
2002) ("Hazelwood entrusts to educators these decisions that require judgments based
on viewpoint.").
212 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
213 See id. at 857-59 (plurality opinion).
214 Id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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eign." 215 For Rehnquist, "when government plays the role of educator

at the elementary and secondary levels, it necessarily and ideally incul2 16
cates values and engages in 'the selective conveyance of ideas.'"
Moreover, Rehnquist highlighted that "actions by the government as
educator do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions
by the government as sovereign.

' 217

Unlike when the government

proscribes speech for the citizenry in general, when the government
acts as educator, it simply determines that such speech "will not be
included in the curriculum." 2 18 Thus, when the school is not advancing its state-defined curriculum, students may still have access to those
ideas.
When the government acts as educator, the theoretical basis for
the First Amendment's viewpoint-neutrality requirement loses force.
In Abrams v. United States,219 Justice Holmes advanced the marketplace
of ideas theory, writing that "the best test of truth is the power of the
220
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
This principle has gained acceptance, with subsequent courts
affirming that "the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." 221 The marketplace of ideas theory reflects a reasoned distrust

in enabling government to dictate what thoughts are "good" or "true."
Yet, when the government acts as educator this is precisely its task.
Although Tinker suggested that "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas,' " 22 2 it clearly is not. Rather, in the classroom,
teachers are entrusted with teaching students a delineated set of statedefined values, concepts, and ideas.
The judicial tradition of granting deference to local authorities
also counsels against a viewpoint-neutrality requirement for schoolsponsored speech. 223 Just as the tradition of public education has
been value inculcative, so too has it "always been under local political
control." 224 Indeed, these two precepts go hand in hand, as "insofar
as public schools are value inculcators for creating the proper citizen
215 Id.
216 See Bitensky, supra note 205, at 811 (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
217 Pico, 457 U.S. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

218 Id.
219

250 U.S. 616 (1919).

220 Id. at 630

(Holmes, J., dissenting).
221 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
222 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
223 See Diamond, supra note 205, at 497-98.
224 Id. at 498.
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for the community, the community has been defined as a local
one";225 and "the needs of that community are best perceived" by a
local school board, not a judge.2 26 In addition, because school board
members are elected by the people, they may not exercise unchecked
discretion. 227 Ultimately, it seems wise to defer to those "trained and
2 28
experienced in the pedagogical needs of students."
3.

Avoiding the Viewpoint-Based, Content-Based Controversy

Allowing educators to make viewpoint-based judgments reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns also avoids the linedrawing difficulties implicated by the imprecise, and often illusory,
229
distinction between viewpoint-based and content-based restrictions.
Under Hazelwood, courts may already invalidate content-based school
regulations that discriminate against a viewpoint if the regulation
lacks a legitimate pedagogical purpose. 23 0 Moreover, a distinction
that has proven unwieldy for judges 23 1 will also prove unwieldy for
schools. School officials will not have time to scrutinize the application of a regulation to determine whether it is content-based or viewpoint-based, thus forcing them to act without knowing the
constitutionality of their decisions. Avoiding this "problematic
endeavor"23 2 is not a reason, in and of itself, to permit viewpoint-based
restrictions of school-sponsored speech, but its ancillary benefit is
worth acknowledging.

225 Id. at 509.
226 Id.
227 See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("In order to fulfill its function, an elected school board must express its
views on the subjects which are taught to its students. In doing so those elected officials express the views of their community; they may err, of course, and the voters may
remove them. It is a startling erosion of the very idea of democratic government to
have this Court arrogate to itself the power the plurality asserts today." (emphasis
omitted)).
228 Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have ConstitutionalRights? Keeping Order in
the Public Schools, 65 CEO. WASH. L. REiv. 49, 102 (1996).
229 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
230 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
231 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
232 Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 630 (2d Cir.
2005).
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Subjecting Viewpoint-Based Restrictions of School-Sponsored
Speech to Strict Scrutiny Is Cost-Prohibitive

Other policy considerations also tilt the scales in favor of allowing
viewpoint-based restrictions in the realm of school-sponsored speech.
Subjecting viewpoint-based regulations of school-sponsored speech to
strict scrutiny would be too costly-literally, in terms of litigation
defense and, figuratively, in terms of the speech-chilling effect on a
school's regulatory efforts and undermining of a school's educational
mission. Strict scrutiny, a rigorous judicial test still perceived by many
to be "fatal in fact," would be nearly impossible to satisfy. While a
school would have no problem putting forth a compelling interest, its
regulations would almost certainly fail to clear the additional hurdles
of underinclusiveness and narrow tailoring. 23 3 Consequently, the
number of frivolous lawsuits filed "against our already overburdened
234
and cash-strapped public schools" would increase.
Moreover, the application of strict scrutiny would not chill independent, Tinker-type student speech, but the speech of the school
itself-robbing teachers of the "appropriate and necessary control of
their classrooms.

' 235

Faced with the prospect of expensive, protracted

litigation, schools would be dissuaded from regulating school-sponsored speech, even if they had legitimate and reasonable pedagogical
reasons for doing so. Thus, "[t] o the extent that strict scrutiny in general inhibits sensible viewpoint-based regulation of at least apparently
school-sponsored speech," schools' own free speech interests would
"suffer. "236
5.

School-Sponsored Speech Is Tantamount to Government
Speech

The text of Hazelwood, the special capacity of the government as
educator, and policy considerations suggest that the "special characteristics of the school environment" warrant abandoning an ironclad
viewpoint-neutrality requirement in the realm of school-sponsored
speech. However, the answer might be even simpler-found in the
viewpoint neutrality doctrine itself. It is well-established that when the
government speaks, "it need not ensure viewpoint diversity and can
233 See Wright, supra note 122, at 212.
234 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Peck ex rel.
Peck, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006) (No. 05-899).
235
236

Id.
Wright, supra note 122, at 213.
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simply express its own viewpoint." 237 Thus, "when [a public school]
determines the content of the education it provides, it is the [state]
speaking" and it may "regulate the content of what is or is not
238
expressed."
The constitutionality of viewpoint-based decisions extends
beyond the government's own literal speech. When the state enlists
private actors or entities to "convey its own message," viewpoint neutrality is not required. 239 School-sponsored speech, according to
Hazelwood, includes all those expressive activities that "are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences." 240 Thus, during a curricular activity, regardless of who speaks, whether teacher, student, parent, or participant, the speaker is the school. Accordingly, it may
decide what content and viewpoint are appropriate in order to
advance its pedagogical interests. Hazelwood also deems speech "that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably per24 1
ceive to bear the imprimatur of the school" to be school sponsored.
This category, which encompasses speech that could be construed to
be the school's, can also be fairly categorized as akin to government
speech. When school-sponsored speech is viewed as analogous to
"government speech," abandoning the forum doctrine's viewpointneutrality requirement does not defy doctrine, but adheres to it.
The public employee speech cases provide an instructive analogy
to the classification of school-sponsored speech as tantamount to government speech. Similar to student speech jurisprudence, in which
courts must balance the interests of the student as citizen with the
interests of the state as educator, in implementing a prescribed curriculum, in the realm of employee-speech jurisprudence, courts must
balance the interests of the employee as citizen and "the interest[s] of
the State, as ... employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." 242 In its recent decision
in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2 4 3 the Court "address[ed] the constitutional status of a public employee's speech made in furtherance of employment
237 Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 151 (2d Cir. 2004); see
also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (stating that the government may make
viewpoint-based decisions when promoting its own policies through its own speech).
238 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
239 See id.
240 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
241 Id.
242 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
243 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).
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' 244

According to the Court, when public employees speak
"pursuant to [their] official duties," they do not speak "as citizens for
First Amendment purposes."245 Indeed, courts have recognized that
"[w]hile acting as a business, a government agency is charged with
maintaining an efficient workplace, and therefore has an interest in
censoring speech that could be counterproductive to its operations. ' 2 46 Just as governmental employees are subject to the constraints of the government as employer in matters concerning the
workplace's effective operation, so too are students, who "have been
' 247
committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster,
subject to the constraints of the government as educator concerning

the school's effective implementation of its curriculum.
6.

The Proper, Restrictive, Application of Hazelwood

Sanctioning viewpoint-based regulations under Hazelwood is not
to be done without pause and a bit of apprehension. Courts have
consistently regarded viewpoint-based regulations as presenting the
"greatest danger to liberty of expression.

'248

Such strong disapproval

cannot be easily overlooked. Thus, although an exception should be
made for school-sponsored speech, in cases in which Hazelwood is
appropriate, courts should nonetheless ensure that the "legitimate
pedagogical" reasons set forth by school officials are not merely a pre249
text for suppressing a viewpoint with which they disagree.
Moreover, if viewpoint-based restrictions are permitted, the scope
250
of "school-sponsored speech" must be narrow and well-defined.
244 Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of Government Employees in Light of the Public
Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 797, 811 (2007).
245 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
246 Bryan M. Schwartz, Education: Balancing the Interests of Schools, Students, and the
Community, 75 DENy. U. L. REv. 801, 809-10 (1998).
247 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
248 Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 697, 698 (1996).
249 See Roy, supra note 31, at 668; see also, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d
1277, 1293 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing a district court's grant of summary judgment,
finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a university's speech restriction
"was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious discrimination"). In
Axson-Flynn, the court said: "Although we do not second-guess the pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator's goal, we would be abdicating our judicial duty if we
failed to investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern was pretextual." Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis omitted).
250 Because courts accord significant deference to restrictions classified as "schoolsponsored," a broad construction of the category would grant a school potentially
limitless latitude to regulate student speech.
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Hazelwood deference should not be accorded to speech merely implicating a pedagogical concern, 25 1 but to speech tantamount to the government's own speech. Thus, when students are called upon to
communicate their own views pursuant to a class discussion or assignment, restrictions must be viewpoint-neutral (unless such speech can
be regulated under Tinker) because the expression does not "bear the
imprimatur of the school" and does not represent the school's own
curricular speech. 252 Ultimately, while a school has the right to determine the content of its curriculum and transmit curricular messages
clearly, once a teacher invites the personal views of students, principles of viewpoint neutrality must govern.
B.

The Court Should Prohibit Viewpoint-Based Restrictions of Independent
Student Speech FallingOutside the Scope of Tinker

While Part IV.A considered viewpoint neutrality's application to
school-sponsored speech, this subpart examines viewpoint neutrality's
application to independent student speech. Viewpoint neutrality does
not apply to the state's own speech; but in the realm of independent
student speech, where the government is not determining and transmitting "the content of the education it provides," 2 53 viewpoint neutrality is essential, as it enables students to express themselves freely
and gain exposure to a variety of views. Thus, for viewpoint-based
restrictions of independent student speech to pass constitutional muster, administrators must meet Tinker's high "material and substantial"
disruption standard. 254 Under this doctrinal framework, Morse, which
upheld a viewpoint-based restriction of independent student speech
falling outside the scope of Tinker,2 55 comes out wrong.

1. Pedagogical Interests Present, but Not Pressing
A public school acting in the special capacity of educator is entitled, indeed commanded, to convey a specific curriculum and inculcate specific values. The ability to make viewpoint-based restrictions
251 See, e.g., Fleming v.Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir.
2002); Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DuKE L.J. 685, 693-94.
252 Justice Alito advanced a similar argument in Oliva, stating: "Things that students express in class or in assignments when called upon do not 'bear the imprimatur of the school.'" See C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (Alito,J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 271 (1988)).
253 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
254 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
255 See supra Part III.B.
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reasonably related to pedagogical concerns is necessary so that it may
execute its educational mission in an unadulterated manner. However, when the school is not speaking-that is, when it is not actively
advancing a curricular message-pedagogical concerns may be present, but are not nearly as pressing.
Hazelwoods deferential standard for school-sponsored speech,
which permits viewpoint-based restrictions with a pedagogical purpose, 256 ensures the state's ability to effectively convey an educational
message. However, outside of the school-sponsored realm, a viewpoint-neutrality requirement would function to protect the state's
message from being challenged. The curricular/noncurricular
dichotomy established by Tinker and Hazelwood enables a school to
implement its curriculum without silencing the individual expression
of students.
Some, like Justice Thomas, might argue that pedagogical inter25 7
ests should always take precedence inside the schoolhouse gate.
But in Tinker, Justice Fortas correctly observed that the mission of
public schools-to implement a formal curriculum-does not and
should not preclude students from expressing their opinions. 258 Fortas
cautioned that students must not become "closed-circuit recipients" of
the state; 259 and the stringent Tinker standard, which places a heavy
burden on the state to justify restrictions of independent student
speech, ensures that they will not be confined to state-sanctioned viewpoints. Ultimately, by recognizing that pedagogical concerns are less
pressing in the realm of independent student speech and lowering
the threshold for viewpoint-based restrictions accordingly, the Tinker/
Hazelwood doctrinal framework serves to reconcile the so-called "dem'260
ocratic-educational paradox.
2.

Marketplace of Ideas Theory Applicable to Independent
Student Speech

While the marketplace of ideas theory seems misplaced when a
school acts in the capacity of educator and aims to inculcate a specific
256 See supra Part V.A.1.
257 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630-32 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
258 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
259 See id.
260 See generally Redish & Finnerty, supra note 203, at 66 ("[I]f, as liberal democratic theory assumes, democracy requires widespread education of the electorate in
order to function properly, one is left with a seemingly intractable paradox: the very
process that is essential to the success of democracy threatens the fundamental preconditions of democracy." (footnote omitted)).
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value or advance a specific message, it is highly relevant to the realm
of independent student speech. Indeed, it is in the "cradle of our
democracy" 26 1 that students first gain "exposure to [the] robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.' ' 262 In the halls, the cafeteria, and on the playground, the
school community, a microcosm of society at large, represents a minimarketplace of ideas. Thus, during non-instructional time, students,
as "'persons' under our Constitution,"' 26 3 may exercise their First

Amendment rights and express their (nondisruptive) personal views.
Students should not be shielded from the diversity of opinions they
will inevitably encounter in the democratic marketplace.
Speech restrictive theories have been rejected by countless courts
outside of the student-speech arena.26 4 "[A]gainst the background of
a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,"' 26 5 the Supreme Court has resoundingly stated that the solution to problematic speech is more speech,
not less. 2 6 6 Thus, in the secondary school environment, 267 just like in
the real world, "bad" speech can be countered by "good" speech. 268
In fact, topics freely discussed by students will result in increased
261 Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
262 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (first alteration
added)).
263

Id. at 511.

264 See, e.g.,
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("Surely the State has no
right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the
most squeamish among us. ... [W)hile the particular four-letter word being litigated
here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often
true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969) ("[Tlhe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
265

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

266 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression."), overruled in part by
Brandenburg,395 U.S. 444.
267 Unlike at the elementary level, secondary level students possess the maturity
necessary to independently evaluate speech.
268 See Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint
Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 243 (2004).
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administrative awareness of potentially "harmful" topics and thus pose
269
less danger to students than an insidious culture of silence.
The advancement of a state-prescribed curriculum is inherently
at odds with the concept of a marketplace of ideas and some might
argue that it has no application to the school environment at all. But
although American society now seems far removed from the totalitarian fears that animated the Tinker opinion, history reveals that the
270
right to dissent from the majority has not always been preserved.
Thus, while schools inherently advance certain viewpoints in the confines of the curriculum and consequently might need to restrict conflicting viewpoints, outside of this instructional context students must
be permitted to freely explore varied social, political, and religious
viewpoints.
3.

Teaching Tolerance

Free speech in public schools is particularly essential in order to
foster tolerance in future generations. Instead of silencing students, it
is "[f]ar better to teach them . . . about why we tolerate divergent
views." 27 1 Schools are vehicles of socialization and some social values,
like tolerance, cannot simply be taught within the confines of a classroom. According to Lee Bollinger, "[F]ree speech involves a special
act of carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary selfrestraint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a social
272
capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters."
Thus, free speech in schools will teach students to "understand and
control the 'impulse toward intolerance' that is present in everyonean impulse that... if unchecked, can have devastating consequences
for society." 273 Ultimately, while a viewpoint-neutrality requirement
applied to restrictions of school-sponsored speech would hinder a
school from advancing the state's curriculum, outside of the curricu269 See id.
270 See Redish & Finnerty, supra note 203, at 116-17 ("It would defy reality.., to
assume that the right to dissent from widely shared public values has been uniformly
preserved throughout American history. Indeed, from the Alien and Sedition Acts to
the suppression of dissent during the Civil War to the compelled patriotism of the
World War I period to the Red Scares of both post-world war periods, the United
States has often refused to tolerate substantial dissent from widely held political

views.").
271

Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir.

1993).
272 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETV 10 (1986).
273 David A. Strauss, Why Be Tolerant?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1485, 1486 (1986) (book

review).
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lar context, a viewpoint-neutrality requirement would facilitate the
inculcation of social values such as tolerance.
4.

The Pre-Morse Constitutional Framework Strikes the Proper
Balance

If viewpoint-based restrictions are freely permitted in the realm of
independent student speech, students' free speech rights will be
severely compromised. Indeed, Tinker acknowledged that a student's
views may cause a disturbance, but insisted that "our Constitution says
we must take this risk." 2 74 Those arguing against viewpoint neutrality

maintain that the risk is too great-namely, that allowing students to
contradict the teachings of the school, for example, on issues such as
illegal drugs and sex, diminishes the school's effectiveness and endangers students. 275 But the "constitutionally permissible ways of regulat-

ing student speech provide ample means of ensuring that student
expression does not interfere with the effective operation of the
schools or cause harm to other students." 2 76 Under Fraser,a school
may restrict speech that is lewd or vulgar2 77 and, under Tinker, it may
restrict speech (even on the basis of viewpoint) that causes a material
disruption of class (or has the potential to have such an effect).278
Thus, if "the expression of a . . . [student's] viewpoint, such as one

espousing racial hatred, creates a sufficient threat, school authorities
may intervene." 279 Further, a school may presumably restrict speech
on the basis of viewpoint if it can satisfy strict scrutiny.
The danger that schools will invoke the material and substantial
disruption justification as a pretext for viewpoint-based disagreement
with student speech exists under Tinker just as the same pretextual
danger exists under Hazelwood. While the risk of pretextual restrictions is present, it is outweighed by the greater risk of a significant,
perhaps even violent, disruption of the school. Ultimately, the
Tinker! Hazelwood framework strikes the proper balance between a
school's pedagogical and safety interests and the countervailing free
speech interests of students.
274 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
275 The argument proceeds from the assumption that students are impressionable
and unable to make decisions for themselves.
276 See, e.g., C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
277 See supra Part 1I.B.
278 See supra Part II.A.
279 See, e.g., Oliva, 226 F.3d at 212 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Morse's Slippery Slope

The Court, in Morse, ill-advisedly "invent[ed] out of whole cloth a
special First Amendment rule" 280 permitting viewpoint-based restrictions of illegal drug advocacy. Ironically, the Court created this new
exception despite internal disagreement regarding whether the
speech at issue was even viewpoint-based to begin with. 28 1 However,
although the dissent quibbled over the meaning of the banner, ultimately, all of the Justices, except Justice Breyer, appeared to endorse
282
viewpoint-based restrictions of some pro-drug advocacy.

Unlike his fellow jurists, Breyer decided Morse on qualified immunity grounds. 28 3 Citing the narrow, fact-specific question at issue, he
contended that reaching the merits of the First Amendment question
was both "unwise and unnecessary." 284 He was right. The Court's

viewpoint-based holding "raise[s] a host of serious concerns. '28 5
Breyer briefly touched on the most serious of these concerns when he
critiqued the Court's rationale for the restriction. According to
Breyer: "To say that illegal drug use is harmful to students, while
surely true, does not itself constitute a satisfying explanation because
there are many such harms." 28 6 Paradoxically, the Justice who did not
decide the First Amendment question provided the most accurate
analysis of the issue.
In Morse, the Supreme Court opened Pandora's Box by eschewing viewpoint neutrality on account of the "threat to student safety"
posed by illegal drug advocacy. 287 The Court's holding might appear
limited; however, the primary justification Chief Justice Roberts
invoked to reach the decision-that illegal drug use is "harmful" to
students-is harmful to First Amendment principles. Indeed, as
280 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2650 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281 See supra note 7.
282 For Justice Thomas, because students' speech is not protected by the First
Amendment, no viewpoint-based exception would be necessary. See supra note 182

and accompanying text.
283 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (BreyerJ., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part) ("This Court need not and should not decide this difficult First Amendment
issue on the merits. Rather, I believe that it should simply hold that qualified immunity bars the student's claim for monetary damages and say no more." (emphasis
added)). According to Breyer, the Court should abandon the rigid Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001), "order-of-battle rule," which requires courts to determine
whether a constitutional right was violated before considering whether an official is

entitled to qualified immunity. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2641.
284 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638.
285 Id. at 2639.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 2638.
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Breyer portended, the Court's logic can be easily extended to silence
students on any controversial issue that an administrator subjectively
deems "harmful."
Permitting a school to suppress independent student speech
based on disagreement with the speaker's viewpoint and an attenuated link to harm creates a slippery slope. "Tinker.

.

.has survived

since 1969 because it strikes the appropriate balance regarding [independent] student speech-that which substantially disrupts school
activities is not permitted; all else is."288 By upholding a viewpointbased restriction that did not meet Tinker's material and substantial
disruption standard, "Morse eliminated that balance as to one topic":
drug use. 289

Now,

other cases drawing on Morse's logic threaten to

290
eliminate other "harmful" viewpoints.
Although Alito's concurrence appears to limit Morse's holding, its
underlying rationale may invite lower courts to expand its scope. For

example, in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District,291 the Fifth Cir-

cuit acknowledged that Alito went to great lengths to "point out that
the reasoning of the Court [could not] be extended to other kinds of
regulations of content"; 292 however, it then extended the concurrence, holding that "the student speech area demarcated by Justice
Alito in Morse" includes "speech pertaining to grave harms arising
from the particular character of the school setting." 29 3 Thus, presumably, if a court could construe a viewpoint as particularly harmful, that
viewpoint could be suppressed. Ultimately, a viewpoint-neutrality
requirement operating outside of the realm of Tinker will prevent
courts from sliding down this slippery slope, suppressing the robust
dialogue that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
CONCLUSION

The Morse dissent was correct when it conceded that "some
targeted viewpoint discrimination" might be appropriate in the school
setting. 294 Although when the government acts as sovereign, view288

See Douglas Lee, Fifth CircuitExtends Limits on Student Speech, FIRST AMENDMENT
Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=

CENTER,

19363.
289 Id.
290 See id. Under the logic of Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District, 508 F.3d
765 (5th Cir. 2007), "the First Amendment does not protect any speech that advocates
or threatens a harm at least as serious as illegal drug use." Lee, supra note 288.
291 508 F.3d 765.
292 Id. at 770.
293 Id.
294 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2646 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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point neutrality comprises the "bedrock principle" 295 of the First
Amendment, functioning to maintain a marketplace of ideas free
from governmental interference, public schools cannot stand on such
a foundation. Indeed, when the government acts as educator, it necessarily chooses what ideas to transmit and, in order to effectuate its
mission, must be able to convey a clear curricular message.
Hazelwoods distinction between the state's curricular speech and
a student's independent speech constitutes the constitutional
lynchpin enabling the Court to import viewpoint neutrality into public schools. This distinction, which hinges on the pedagogical interests of the government as educator and the expressive interests of
students as citizens, reveals that school-sponsored expression and
independent student expression merit different degrees of viewpoint
protection. In the realm of school-sponsored speech, when the state
communicates a curricular message or is perceived to be speaking,
viewpoint neutrality is neither necessary nor appropriate. However,
when the government is not advancing a curricular message, viewpoint neutrality is essential. Schools are not merely asked to advance
a curriculum, but also to foster the kind of independent thought and
experimentation which constitute the essence of our intellectual tradition. 296 If viewpoint-based restrictions on independent student
speech are freely permitted, the former function will swallow the latter. Thus, viewpoint neutrality must be required for independent student speech that does not pose the threat of a material and substantial
disruption.
By establishing a new, viewpoint-based rule instead of operating
under the Tinker/Hazelwood dichotomy, Morse created a judicially
impractical framework that cannot be sustained. As Justice Thomas
highlighted in his concurrence, the Court's student speech jurisprudence is already extremely complex.

297

Indeed, "the more detailed

the Court's supervision becomes, the more likely its law will engender
further disputes among teachers and students."' 298 Thus, Morse was
295 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
296 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835
(1995) (describing the danger to speech "from the chilling of individual thought and
expression" as "especially real . . . where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition").
297 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I am afraid that our
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools except when
they don't-a standard continuously developed through litigation against local
schools and their administrators.").
298 Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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correctly decided by the Ninth Circuit, which analyzed the case under
the existing framework, concluding that the student's independent
29 9
speech could not be constitutionally restricted under Tinker.
Applying the First Amendment to student speech is a difficult
endeavor. In fact, some might suggest that "the freedom of speech
would be better served, nurtured, and protected if education. . . took
place in non-state, 'First Amendment institutions,' at public
expense.13 0 0 However, as long as public schools remain under governmental control, difficult constitutional issues, such as the place of
viewpoint neutrality in schools, must be addressed, not ignored. If the
nation's highest court consistently refuses to clarify the place of viewpoint neutrality in the school setting, students, teachers, school districts, and lower courts will continue to become entangled in the
current constitutional thicket, and, consequently, expend time and
money seeking direction from the Court.

299 On the qualified immunity question, however, this author disagrees with the
Ninth Circuit's holding.
300 See Garnett, supra note 10, at 59; see also, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Right
Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDozo L. REV. 1281 (2002) (arguing in favor of school-choice programs).
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